Fire and Fury inside the Trump white house Michael Wolff prologue
ALSO BY MICHAEL WOLFF
Television Is the New Television:
The Unexpected Triumph of Old Media in the Digital Age
The Man Who Owns the News:
Inside the Secret World of Rupert Murdoch
Autumn of the Moguls:
My Misadventures with the Titans, Poseurs, and Money Guys Who Mastered and Messed Up Big
Media
Burn Rate:
How I Survived the Gold Rush Years on the Internet
Where We Stand
White Kids
For Victoria and Louise, mother and daughter
CONTENTS
AUTHOR’S NOTE
PROLOGUE: AILES AND BANNON
1. ELECTION DAY
2. TRUMP TOWER
3. DAY ONE
4. BANNON
5. JARVANKA
6. AT HOME
7. RUSSIA
8. ORG CHART
9. CPAC
10. GOLDMAN
11. WIRETAP
12. REPEAL AND REPLACE
13. BANNON AGONISTES
14. SITUATION ROOM
15. MEDIA
16. COMEY
17. ABROAD AND AT HOME
18. BANNON REDUX
19. MIKA WHO?
20. MCMASTER AND SCARAMUCCI
21. BANNON AND SCARAMUCCI
22. GENERAL KELLY
EPILOGUE: BANNON AND TRUMP
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
INDEX
AUTHOR’S NOTE
The reason to write this book could not be more obvious. With the inauguration of Donald Trump on
January 20, 2017, the United States entered the eye of the most extraordinary political storm since at
least Watergate. As the day approached, I set out to tell this story in as contemporaneous a fashion as
possible, and to try to see life in the Trump White House through the eyes of the people closest to it.
This was originally conceived as an account of the Trump administration’s first hundred days, that
most traditional marker of a presidency. But events barreled on without natural pause for more than
two hundred days, the curtain coming down on the first act of Trump’s presidency only with the
appointment of retired general John Kelly as the chief of staff in late July and the exit of chief
strategist Stephen K. Bannon three weeks later.
The events I’ve described in these pages are based on conversations that took place over a period
of eighteen months with the president, with most members of his senior staff—some of whom talked
to me dozens of times—and with many people who they in turn spoke to. The first interview occurred
well before I could have imagined a Trump White House, much less a book about it, in late May 2016
at Trump’s home in Beverly Hills—the then candidate polishing off a pint of Häagen-Dazs vanilla as
he happily and idly opined about a range of topics while his aides, Hope Hicks, Corey Lewandowski,
and Jared Kushner, went in and out of the room. Conversations with members of the campaign’s team
continued through the Republican Convention in Cleveland, when it was still hardly possible to
conceive of Trump’s election. They moved on to Trump Tower with a voluble Steve Bannon—before
the election, when he still seemed like an entertaining oddity, and later, after the election, when he
seemed like a miracle worker.
Shortly after January 20, I took up something like a semipermanent seat on a couch in the West
Wing. Since then I have conducted more than two hundred interviews.
While the Trump administration has made hostility to the press a virtual policy, it has also been
more open to the media than any White House in recent memory. In the beginning, I sought a level of
formal access to this White House, something of a fly-on-the-wall status. The president himself
encouraged this idea. But, given the many fiefdoms in the Trump White House that came into open
conflict from the first days of the administration, there seemed no one person able to make this
happen. Equally, there was no one to say “Go away.” Hence I became more a constant interloper than
an invited guest—something quite close to an actual fly on the wall—having accepted no rules nor
having made any promises about what I might or might not write.
Many of the accounts of what has happened in the Trump White House are in conflict with one
another; many, in Trumpian fashion, are baldly untrue. Those conflicts, and that looseness with the
truth, if not with reality itself, are an elemental thread of the book. Sometimes I have let the players
offer their versions, in turn allowing the reader to judge them. In other instances I have, through a
consistency in accounts and through sources I have come to trust, settled on a version of events I
believe to be true.
Some of my sources spoke to me on so-called deep background, a convention of contemporary
political books that allows for a disembodied description of events provided by an unnamed witness
to them. I have also relied on off-the-record interviews, allowing a source to provide a direct quote
with the understanding that it was not for attribution. Other sources spoke to me with the
understanding that the material in the interviews would not become public until the book came out.
Finally, some sources spoke forthrightly on the record.
At the same time, it is worth noting some of the journalistic conundrums that I faced when dealing
with the Trump administration, many of them the result of the White House’s absence of official
procedures and the lack of experience of its principals. These challenges have included dealing with
off-the-record or deep-background material that was later casually put on the record; sources who
provided accounts in confidence and subsequently shared them widely, as though liberated by their
first utterances; a frequent inattention to setting any parameters on the use of a conversation; a
source’s views being so well known and widely shared that it would be risible not to credit them; and
the almost samizdat sharing, or gobsmacked retelling, of otherwise private and deep-background
conversations. And everywhere in this story is the president’s own constant, tireless, and
uncontrolled voice, public and private, shared by others on a daily basis, sometimes virtually as he
utters it.
For whatever reason, almost everyone I contacted—senior members of the White House staff as
well as dedicated observers of it—shared large amounts of time with me and went to great effort to
help shed light on the unique nature of life inside the Trump White House. In the end, what I
witnessed, and what this book is about, is a group of people who have struggled, each in their own
way, to come to terms with the meaning of working for Donald Trump.
I owe them an enormous debt.
T
PROLOGUE:
AILES AND BANNON
he evening began at six-thirty, but Steve Bannon, suddenly among the world’s most powerful men
and now less and less mindful of time constraints, was late.
Bannon had promised to come to this small dinner arranged by mutual friends in a Greenwich
Village town house to see Roger Ailes, the former head of Fox News and the most significant figure
in right-wing media and Bannon’s sometime mentor. The next day, January 4, 2017—little more than
two weeks before the inauguration of his friend Donald Trump as the forty-fifth president—Ailes
would be heading to Palm Beach, into a forced, but he hoped temporary, retirement.
Snow was threatening, and for a while the dinner appeared doubtful. The seventy-six-year-old
Ailes, with a long history of leg and hip problems, was barely walking, and, coming in to Manhattan
with his wife Beth from their upstate home on the Hudson, was wary of slippery streets. But Ailes
was eager to see Bannon. Bannon’s aide, Alexandra Preate, kept texting steady updates on Bannon’s
progress extracting himself from Trump Tower.
As the small group waited for Bannon, it was Ailes’s evening. Quite as dumbfounded by his old
friend Donald Trump’s victory as most everyone else, Ailes provided the gathering with something of
a mini-seminar on the randomness and absurdities of politics. Before launching Fox News in 1996,
Ailes had been, for thirty years, among the leading political operatives in the Republican Party. As
surprised as he was by this election, he could yet make a case for a straight line from Nixon to Trump.
He just wasn’t sure, he said, that Trump himself, at various times a Republican, Independent, and
Democrat, could make the case. Still, he thought he knew Trump as well as anyone did and was eager
to offer his help. He was also eager to get back into the right-wing media game, and he energetically
described some of the possibilities for coming up with the billion or so dollars he thought he would
need for a new cable network.
Both men, Ailes and Bannon, fancied themselves particular students of history, both autodidacts
partial to universal field theories. They saw this in a charismatic sense—they had a personal
relationship with history, as well as with Donald Trump.
Now, however reluctantly, Ailes understood that, at least for the moment, he was passing the rightwing
torch to Bannon. It was a torch that burned bright with ironies. Ailes’s Fox News, with its $1.5
billion in annual profits, had dominated Republican politics for two decades. Now Bannon’s
Breitbart News, with its mere $1.5 million in annual profits, was claiming that role. For thirty years,
Ailes—until recently the single most powerful person in conservative politics—had humored and
tolerated Donald Trump, but in the end Bannon and Breitbart had elected him.
Six months before, when a Trump victory still seemed out of the realm of the possible, Ailes,
accused of sexual harassment, was cashiered from Fox News in a move engineered by the liberal
sons of conservative eighty-five-year-old Rupert Murdoch, the controlling shareholder of Fox News
and the most powerful media owner of the age. Ailes’s downfall was cause for much liberal
celebration: the greatest conservative bugbear in modern politics had been felled by the new social
norm. Then Trump, hardly three months later, accused of vastly more louche and abusive behavior,
was elected president.
* * *
Ailes enjoyed many things about Trump: his salesmanship, his showmanship, his gossip. He admired
Trump’s sixth sense for the public marketplace—or at least the relentlessness and indefatigability of
his ceaseless attempts to win it over. He liked Trump’s game. He liked Trump’s impact and his
shamelessness. “He just keeps going,” Ailes had marveled to a friend after the first debate with
Hillary Clinton. “You hit Donald along the head, and he keeps going. He doesn’t even know he’s been
hit.”
But Ailes was convinced that Trump had no political beliefs or backbone. The fact that Trump had
become the ultimate avatar of Fox’s angry common man was another sign that we were living in an
upside-down world. The joke was on somebody—and Ailes thought it might be on him.
Still, Ailes had been observing politicians for decades, and in his long career he had witnessed
just about every type and style and oddity and confection and cravenness and mania. Operatives like
himself—and now, like Bannon—worked with all kinds. It was the ultimate symbiotic and
codependent relationship. Politicians were front men in a complex organizational effort. Operatives
knew the game, and so did most candidates and officeholders. But Ailes was pretty sure Trump did
not. Trump was undisciplined—he had no capacity for any game plan. He could not be a part of any
organization, nor was he likely to subscribe to any program or principle. In Ailes’s view, he was “a
rebel without a cause.” He was simply “Donald”—as though nothing more need be said.
In early August, less than a month after Ailes had been ousted from Fox News, Trump asked his
old friend to take over the management of his calamitous campaign. Ailes, knowing Trump’s
disinclination to take advice, or even listen to it, turned him down. This was the job Bannon took a
week later.
After Trump’s victory, Ailes seemed to balance regret that he had not seized the chance to run his
friend’s campaign with incredulity that Trump’s offer had turned out to be the ultimate opportunity.
Trump’s rise to power, Ailes understood, was the improbable triumph of many things that Ailes and
Fox News represented. After all, Ailes was perhaps the person most responsible for unleashing the
angry-man currents of Trump’s victory: he had invented the right-wing media that delighted in the
Trump character.
Ailes, who was a member of the close circle of friends and advisers Trump frequently called,
found himself hoping he would get more time with the new president once he and Beth moved to Palm
Beach; he knew Trump planned to make regular trips to Mar-a-Lago, down the road from Ailes’s new
home. Still, though Ailes was well aware that in politics, winning changes everything—the winner is
the winner—he couldn’t quite get his head around the improbable and bizarre fact that his friend
Donald Trump was now president of the United States.
* * *
At nine-thirty, three hours late, a good part of the dinner already eaten, Bannon finally arrived.
Wearing a disheveled blazer, his signature pairing of two shirts, and military fatigues, the unshaven,
overweight sixty-three-year-old joined the other guests at the table and immediately took control of
the conversation. Pushing a proffered glass of wine away—“I don’t drink”—he dived into a live
commentary, an urgent download of information about the world he was about to take over.
“We’re going to flood the zone so we have every cabinet member for the next seven days through
their confirmation hearings,” he said of the business-and-military 1950s-type cabinet choices.
“Tillerson is two days, Session is two days, Mattis is two days. . . .”
Bannon veered from “Mad Dog” Mattis—the retired four-star general whom Trump had nominated
as secretary of defense—to a long riff on torture, the surprising liberalism of generals, and the
stupidity of the civilian-military bureaucracy. Then it was on to the looming appointment of Michael
Flynn—a favorite Trump general who’d been the opening act at many Trump rallies—as the National
Security Advisor.
“He’s fine. He’s not Jim Mattis and he’s not John Kelly . . . but he’s fine. He just needs the right
staff around him.” Still, Bannon averred: “When you take out all the never-Trump guys who signed all
those letters and all the neocons who got us in all these wars . . . it’s not a deep bench.”
Bannon said he’d tried to push John Bolton, the famously hawkish diplomat, for the job as
National Security Advisor. Bolton was an Ailes favorite, too.
“He’s a bomb thrower,” said Ailes. “And a strange little fucker. But you need him. Who else is
good on Israel? Flynn is a little nutty on Iran. Tillerson”—the secretary of state designate—“just
knows oil.”
“Bolton’s mustache is a problem,” snorted Bannon. “Trump doesn’t think he looks the part. You
know Bolton is an acquired taste.”
“Well, rumors were that he got in trouble because he got in a fight in a hotel one night and chased
some woman.”
“If I told Trump that, he might have the job.”
* * *
Bannon was curiously able to embrace Trump while at the same time suggesting he did not take him
entirely seriously. He had first met Trump, the on-again off-again presidential candidate, in 2010; at a
meeting in Trump Tower, Bannon had proposed to Trump that he spend half a million dollars backing
Tea Party-style candidates as a way to further his presidential ambitions. Bannon left the meeting
figuring that Trump would never cough up that kind of dough. He just wasn’t a serious player.
Between that first encounter and mid-August 2016, when he took over the Trump campaign, Bannon,
beyond a few interviews he had done with Trump for his Breitbart radio show, was pretty sure he
hadn’t spent more than ten minutes in one-on-one conversation with Trump.
But now Bannon’s Zeitgeist moment had arrived. Everywhere there was a sudden sense of global
self-doubt. Brexit in the UK, waves of immigrants arriving on Europe’s angry shores, the
disenfranchisement of the workingman, the specter of more financial meltdown, Bernie Sanders and
his liberal revanchism—everywhere was backlash. Even the most dedicated exponents of globalism
were hesitating. Bannon believed that great numbers of people were suddenly receptive to a new
message: the world needs borders—or the world should return to a time when it had borders. When
America was great. Trump had become the platform for that message.
By that January evening, Bannon had been immersed in Donald Trump’s world for almost five
months. And though he had accumulated a sizable catalogue of Trump’s peculiarities, and cause
enough for possible alarm about the unpredictability of his boss and his views, that did not detract
from Trump’s extraordinary, charismatic appeal to the right-wing, Tea Party, Internet meme base, and
now, in victory, from the opportunity he was giving Steve Bannon.
* * *
“Does he get it?” asked Ailes suddenly, pausing and looking intently at Bannon.
He meant did Trump get it. This seemed to be a question about the right-wing agenda: Did the
playboy billionaire really get the workingman populist cause? But it was possibly a point-blank
question about the nature of power itself. Did Trump get where history had put him?
Bannon took a sip of water. “He gets it,” said Bannon, after hesitating for perhaps a beat too long.
“Or he gets what he gets.”
With a sideways look, Ailes continued to stare him down, as though waiting for Bannon to show
more of his cards.
“Really,” Bannon said. “He’s on the program. It’s his program.” Pivoting from Trump himself,
Bannon plunged on with the Trump agenda. “Day one we’re moving the U.S. embassy to Jerusalem.
Netanyahu’s all in. Sheldon”—Sheldon Adelson, the casino billionaire, far-right Israel defender, and
Trump supporter—“is all in. We know where we’re heading on this.”
“Does Donald know?” asked a skeptical Ailes.
Bannon smiled—as though almost with a wink—and continued:
“Let Jordan take the West Bank, let Egypt take Gaza. Let them deal with it. Or sink trying. The
Saudis are on the brink, Egyptians are on the brink, all scared to death of Persia . . . Yemen, Sinai,
Libya . . . this thing is bad. . . . That’s why Russia is so key. . . . Is Russia that bad? They’re bad guys.
But the world is full of bad guys.”
Bannon offered all this with something like ebullience—a man remaking the world.
“But it’s good to know the bad guys are the bad guys,” said Ailes, pushing Bannon. “Donald may
not know.”
The real enemy, said an on-point Bannon, careful not to defend Trump too much or to dis him at
all, was China. China was the first front in a new cold war. And it had all been misunderstood in the
Obama years—what we thought we understood we didn’t understand at all. That was the failure of
American intelligence. “I think Comey is a third-rate guy. I think Brennan is a second-rate guy,”
Bannon said, dismissing the FBI director and the CIA director.
“The White House right now is like Johnson’s White House in 1968. Susan Rice”—Obama’s
National Security Advisor—“is running the campaign against ISIS as a National Security Advisor.
They’re picking the targets, she’s picking the drone strikes. I mean, they’re running the war with just
as much effectiveness as Johnson in sixty-eight. The Pentagon is totally disengaged from the whole
thing. Intel services are disengaged from the whole thing. The media has let Obama off the hook. Take
the ideology away from it, this is complete amateur hour. I don’t know what Obama does. Nobody on
Capitol Hill knows him, no business guys know him—what has he accomplished, what does he do?”
“Where’s Donald on this?” asked Ailes, now with the clear implication that Bannon was far out
ahead of his benefactor.
“He’s totally on board.”
“Focused?”
“He buys it.”
“I wouldn’t give Donald too much to think about,” said an amused Ailes.
Bannon snorted. “Too much, too little—doesn’t necessarily change things.”
* * *
“What has he gotten himself into with the Russians?” pressed Ailes.
“Mostly,” said Bannon, “he went to Russia and he thought he was going to meet Putin. But Putin
couldn’t give a shit about him. So he’s kept trying.”
“He’s Donald,” said Ailes.
“It’s a magnificent thing,” said Bannon, who had taken to regarding Trump as something like a
natural wonder, beyond explanation.
Again, as though setting the issue of Trump aside—merely a large and peculiar presence to both be
thankful for and to have to abide—Bannon, in the role he had conceived for himself, the auteur of the
Trump presidency, charged forward:
“China’s everything. Nothing else matters. We don’t get China right, we don’t get anything right.
This whole thing is very simple. China is where Nazi Germany was in 1929 to 1930. The Chinese,
like the Germans, are the most rational people in the world, until they’re not. And they’re gonna flip
like Germany in the thirties. You’re going to have a hypernationalist state, and once that happens you
can’t put the genie back in the bottle.”
“Donald might not be Nixon in China,” said Ailes, deadpan, suggesting that for Trump to seize the
mantle of global transformation might strain credulity.
Bannon smiled. “Bannon in China,” he said, with both remarkable grandiosity and wry selfdeprecation.
“How’s the kid?” asked Ailes, referring to Trump’s son-in-law and paramount political adviser,
thirty-six-year-old Jared Kushner.
“He’s my partner,” said Bannon, his tone suggesting that if he felt otherwise, he was nevertheless
determined to stay on message.
“Really?” said a dubious Ailes.
“He’s on the team.”
“He’s had lot of lunches with Rupert.”
“In fact,” said Bannon, “I could use your help here.” Bannon then spent several minutes trying to
recruit Ailes to help kneecap Murdoch. Ailes, since his ouster from Fox, had become only more bitter
towards Murdoch. Now Murdoch was frequently jawboning the president-elect and encouraging him
toward establishment moderation—all a strange inversion in the ever-stranger currents of American
conservatism. Bannon wanted Ailes to suggest to Trump, a man whose many neuroses included a
horror of forgetfulness or senility, that Murdoch might be losing it.
“I’ll call him,” said Ailes. “But Trump would jump through hoops for Rupert. Like for Putin.
Sucks up and shits down. I just worry about who’s jerking whose chain.”
The older right-wing media wizard and the younger (though not by all that much) continued on to
the other guests’ satisfaction until twelve-thirty, the older trying to see through to the new national
enigma that was Trump—although Ailes would say that in fact Trump’s behavior was ever
predictable—and the younger seemingly determined not to spoil his own moment of destiny.
“Donald Trump has got it. He’s Trump, but he’s got it. Trump is Trump,” affirmed Bannon.
“Yeah, he’s Trump,” said Ailes, with something like incredulity.
For Victoria and Louise, mother and daughter
CONTENTS
AUTHOR’S NOTE
PROLOGUE: AILES AND BANNON
1. ELECTION DAY
2. TRUMP TOWER
3. DAY ONE
4. BANNON
5. JARVANKA
6. AT HOME
7. RUSSIA
8. ORG CHART
9. CPAC
10. GOLDMAN
11. WIRETAP
12. REPEAL AND REPLACE
13. BANNON AGONISTES
14. SITUATION ROOM
15. MEDIA
16. COMEY
17. ABROAD AND AT HOME
18. BANNON REDUX
19. MIKA WHO?
20. MCMASTER AND SCARAMUCCI
21. BANNON AND SCARAMUCCI
22. GENERAL KELLY
EPILOGUE: BANNON AND TRUMP
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
INDEX
AUTHOR’S NOTE
The reason to write this book could not be more obvious. With the inauguration of Donald Trump on
January 20, 2017, the United States entered the eye of the most extraordinary political storm since at
least Watergate. As the day approached, I set out to tell this story in as contemporaneous a fashion as
possible, and to try to see life in the Trump White House through the eyes of the people closest to it.
This was originally conceived as an account of the Trump administration’s first hundred days, that
most traditional marker of a presidency. But events barreled on without natural pause for more than
two hundred days, the curtain coming down on the first act of Trump’s presidency only with the
appointment of retired general John Kelly as the chief of staff in late July and the exit of chief
strategist Stephen K. Bannon three weeks later.
The events I’ve described in these pages are based on conversations that took place over a period
of eighteen months with the president, with most members of his senior staff—some of whom talked
to me dozens of times—and with many people who they in turn spoke to. The first interview occurred
well before I could have imagined a Trump White House, much less a book about it, in late May 2016
at Trump’s home in Beverly Hills—the then candidate polishing off a pint of Häagen-Dazs vanilla as
he happily and idly opined about a range of topics while his aides, Hope Hicks, Corey Lewandowski,
and Jared Kushner, went in and out of the room. Conversations with members of the campaign’s team
continued through the Republican Convention in Cleveland, when it was still hardly possible to
conceive of Trump’s election. They moved on to Trump Tower with a voluble Steve Bannon—before
the election, when he still seemed like an entertaining oddity, and later, after the election, when he
seemed like a miracle worker.
Shortly after January 20, I took up something like a semipermanent seat on a couch in the West
Wing. Since then I have conducted more than two hundred interviews.
While the Trump administration has made hostility to the press a virtual policy, it has also been
more open to the media than any White House in recent memory. In the beginning, I sought a level of
formal access to this White House, something of a fly-on-the-wall status. The president himself
encouraged this idea. But, given the many fiefdoms in the Trump White House that came into open
conflict from the first days of the administration, there seemed no one person able to make this
happen. Equally, there was no one to say “Go away.” Hence I became more a constant interloper than
an invited guest—something quite close to an actual fly on the wall—having accepted no rules nor
having made any promises about what I might or might not write.
Many of the accounts of what has happened in the Trump White House are in conflict with one
another; many, in Trumpian fashion, are baldly untrue. Those conflicts, and that looseness with the
truth, if not with reality itself, are an elemental thread of the book. Sometimes I have let the players
offer their versions, in turn allowing the reader to judge them. In other instances I have, through a
consistency in accounts and through sources I have come to trust, settled on a version of events I
believe to be true.
Some of my sources spoke to me on so-called deep background, a convention of contemporary
political books that allows for a disembodied description of events provided by an unnamed witness
to them. I have also relied on off-the-record interviews, allowing a source to provide a direct quote
with the understanding that it was not for attribution. Other sources spoke to me with the
understanding that the material in the interviews would not become public until the book came out.
Finally, some sources spoke forthrightly on the record.
At the same time, it is worth noting some of the journalistic conundrums that I faced when dealing
with the Trump administration, many of them the result of the White House’s absence of official
procedures and the lack of experience of its principals. These challenges have included dealing with
off-the-record or deep-background material that was later casually put on the record; sources who
provided accounts in confidence and subsequently shared them widely, as though liberated by their
first utterances; a frequent inattention to setting any parameters on the use of a conversation; a
source’s views being so well known and widely shared that it would be risible not to credit them; and
the almost samizdat sharing, or gobsmacked retelling, of otherwise private and deep-background
conversations. And everywhere in this story is the president’s own constant, tireless, and
uncontrolled voice, public and private, shared by others on a daily basis, sometimes virtually as he
utters it.
For whatever reason, almost everyone I contacted—senior members of the White House staff as
well as dedicated observers of it—shared large amounts of time with me and went to great effort to
help shed light on the unique nature of life inside the Trump White House. In the end, what I
witnessed, and what this book is about, is a group of people who have struggled, each in their own
way, to come to terms with the meaning of working for Donald Trump.
I owe them an enormous debt.
T
PROLOGUE:
AILES AND BANNON
he evening began at six-thirty, but Steve Bannon, suddenly among the world’s most powerful men
and now less and less mindful of time constraints, was late.
Bannon had promised to come to this small dinner arranged by mutual friends in a Greenwich
Village town house to see Roger Ailes, the former head of Fox News and the most significant figure
in right-wing media and Bannon’s sometime mentor. The next day, January 4, 2017—little more than
two weeks before the inauguration of his friend Donald Trump as the forty-fifth president—Ailes
would be heading to Palm Beach, into a forced, but he hoped temporary, retirement.
Snow was threatening, and for a while the dinner appeared doubtful. The seventy-six-year-old
Ailes, with a long history of leg and hip problems, was barely walking, and, coming in to Manhattan
with his wife Beth from their upstate home on the Hudson, was wary of slippery streets. But Ailes
was eager to see Bannon. Bannon’s aide, Alexandra Preate, kept texting steady updates on Bannon’s
progress extracting himself from Trump Tower.
As the small group waited for Bannon, it was Ailes’s evening. Quite as dumbfounded by his old
friend Donald Trump’s victory as most everyone else, Ailes provided the gathering with something of
a mini-seminar on the randomness and absurdities of politics. Before launching Fox News in 1996,
Ailes had been, for thirty years, among the leading political operatives in the Republican Party. As
surprised as he was by this election, he could yet make a case for a straight line from Nixon to Trump.
He just wasn’t sure, he said, that Trump himself, at various times a Republican, Independent, and
Democrat, could make the case. Still, he thought he knew Trump as well as anyone did and was eager
to offer his help. He was also eager to get back into the right-wing media game, and he energetically
described some of the possibilities for coming up with the billion or so dollars he thought he would
need for a new cable network.
Both men, Ailes and Bannon, fancied themselves particular students of history, both autodidacts
partial to universal field theories. They saw this in a charismatic sense—they had a personal
relationship with history, as well as with Donald Trump.
Now, however reluctantly, Ailes understood that, at least for the moment, he was passing the rightwing
torch to Bannon. It was a torch that burned bright with ironies. Ailes’s Fox News, with its $1.5
billion in annual profits, had dominated Republican politics for two decades. Now Bannon’s
Breitbart News, with its mere $1.5 million in annual profits, was claiming that role. For thirty years,
Ailes—until recently the single most powerful person in conservative politics—had humored and
tolerated Donald Trump, but in the end Bannon and Breitbart had elected him.
Six months before, when a Trump victory still seemed out of the realm of the possible, Ailes,
accused of sexual harassment, was cashiered from Fox News in a move engineered by the liberal
sons of conservative eighty-five-year-old Rupert Murdoch, the controlling shareholder of Fox News
and the most powerful media owner of the age. Ailes’s downfall was cause for much liberal
celebration: the greatest conservative bugbear in modern politics had been felled by the new social
norm. Then Trump, hardly three months later, accused of vastly more louche and abusive behavior,
was elected president.
* * *
Ailes enjoyed many things about Trump: his salesmanship, his showmanship, his gossip. He admired
Trump’s sixth sense for the public marketplace—or at least the relentlessness and indefatigability of
his ceaseless attempts to win it over. He liked Trump’s game. He liked Trump’s impact and his
shamelessness. “He just keeps going,” Ailes had marveled to a friend after the first debate with
Hillary Clinton. “You hit Donald along the head, and he keeps going. He doesn’t even know he’s been
hit.”
But Ailes was convinced that Trump had no political beliefs or backbone. The fact that Trump had
become the ultimate avatar of Fox’s angry common man was another sign that we were living in an
upside-down world. The joke was on somebody—and Ailes thought it might be on him.
Still, Ailes had been observing politicians for decades, and in his long career he had witnessed
just about every type and style and oddity and confection and cravenness and mania. Operatives like
himself—and now, like Bannon—worked with all kinds. It was the ultimate symbiotic and
codependent relationship. Politicians were front men in a complex organizational effort. Operatives
knew the game, and so did most candidates and officeholders. But Ailes was pretty sure Trump did
not. Trump was undisciplined—he had no capacity for any game plan. He could not be a part of any
organization, nor was he likely to subscribe to any program or principle. In Ailes’s view, he was “a
rebel without a cause.” He was simply “Donald”—as though nothing more need be said.
In early August, less than a month after Ailes had been ousted from Fox News, Trump asked his
old friend to take over the management of his calamitous campaign. Ailes, knowing Trump’s
disinclination to take advice, or even listen to it, turned him down. This was the job Bannon took a
week later.
After Trump’s victory, Ailes seemed to balance regret that he had not seized the chance to run his
friend’s campaign with incredulity that Trump’s offer had turned out to be the ultimate opportunity.
Trump’s rise to power, Ailes understood, was the improbable triumph of many things that Ailes and
Fox News represented. After all, Ailes was perhaps the person most responsible for unleashing the
angry-man currents of Trump’s victory: he had invented the right-wing media that delighted in the
Trump character.
Ailes, who was a member of the close circle of friends and advisers Trump frequently called,
found himself hoping he would get more time with the new president once he and Beth moved to Palm
Beach; he knew Trump planned to make regular trips to Mar-a-Lago, down the road from Ailes’s new
home. Still, though Ailes was well aware that in politics, winning changes everything—the winner is
the winner—he couldn’t quite get his head around the improbable and bizarre fact that his friend
Donald Trump was now president of the United States.
* * *
At nine-thirty, three hours late, a good part of the dinner already eaten, Bannon finally arrived.
Wearing a disheveled blazer, his signature pairing of two shirts, and military fatigues, the unshaven,
overweight sixty-three-year-old joined the other guests at the table and immediately took control of
the conversation. Pushing a proffered glass of wine away—“I don’t drink”—he dived into a live
commentary, an urgent download of information about the world he was about to take over.
“We’re going to flood the zone so we have every cabinet member for the next seven days through
their confirmation hearings,” he said of the business-and-military 1950s-type cabinet choices.
“Tillerson is two days, Session is two days, Mattis is two days. . . .”
Bannon veered from “Mad Dog” Mattis—the retired four-star general whom Trump had nominated
as secretary of defense—to a long riff on torture, the surprising liberalism of generals, and the
stupidity of the civilian-military bureaucracy. Then it was on to the looming appointment of Michael
Flynn—a favorite Trump general who’d been the opening act at many Trump rallies—as the National
Security Advisor.
“He’s fine. He’s not Jim Mattis and he’s not John Kelly . . . but he’s fine. He just needs the right
staff around him.” Still, Bannon averred: “When you take out all the never-Trump guys who signed all
those letters and all the neocons who got us in all these wars . . . it’s not a deep bench.”
Bannon said he’d tried to push John Bolton, the famously hawkish diplomat, for the job as
National Security Advisor. Bolton was an Ailes favorite, too.
“He’s a bomb thrower,” said Ailes. “And a strange little fucker. But you need him. Who else is
good on Israel? Flynn is a little nutty on Iran. Tillerson”—the secretary of state designate—“just
knows oil.”
“Bolton’s mustache is a problem,” snorted Bannon. “Trump doesn’t think he looks the part. You
know Bolton is an acquired taste.”
“Well, rumors were that he got in trouble because he got in a fight in a hotel one night and chased
some woman.”
“If I told Trump that, he might have the job.”
* * *
Bannon was curiously able to embrace Trump while at the same time suggesting he did not take him
entirely seriously. He had first met Trump, the on-again off-again presidential candidate, in 2010; at a
meeting in Trump Tower, Bannon had proposed to Trump that he spend half a million dollars backing
Tea Party-style candidates as a way to further his presidential ambitions. Bannon left the meeting
figuring that Trump would never cough up that kind of dough. He just wasn’t a serious player.
Between that first encounter and mid-August 2016, when he took over the Trump campaign, Bannon,
beyond a few interviews he had done with Trump for his Breitbart radio show, was pretty sure he
hadn’t spent more than ten minutes in one-on-one conversation with Trump.
But now Bannon’s Zeitgeist moment had arrived. Everywhere there was a sudden sense of global
self-doubt. Brexit in the UK, waves of immigrants arriving on Europe’s angry shores, the
disenfranchisement of the workingman, the specter of more financial meltdown, Bernie Sanders and
his liberal revanchism—everywhere was backlash. Even the most dedicated exponents of globalism
were hesitating. Bannon believed that great numbers of people were suddenly receptive to a new
message: the world needs borders—or the world should return to a time when it had borders. When
America was great. Trump had become the platform for that message.
By that January evening, Bannon had been immersed in Donald Trump’s world for almost five
months. And though he had accumulated a sizable catalogue of Trump’s peculiarities, and cause
enough for possible alarm about the unpredictability of his boss and his views, that did not detract
from Trump’s extraordinary, charismatic appeal to the right-wing, Tea Party, Internet meme base, and
now, in victory, from the opportunity he was giving Steve Bannon.
* * *
“Does he get it?” asked Ailes suddenly, pausing and looking intently at Bannon.
He meant did Trump get it. This seemed to be a question about the right-wing agenda: Did the
playboy billionaire really get the workingman populist cause? But it was possibly a point-blank
question about the nature of power itself. Did Trump get where history had put him?
Bannon took a sip of water. “He gets it,” said Bannon, after hesitating for perhaps a beat too long.
“Or he gets what he gets.”
With a sideways look, Ailes continued to stare him down, as though waiting for Bannon to show
more of his cards.
“Really,” Bannon said. “He’s on the program. It’s his program.” Pivoting from Trump himself,
Bannon plunged on with the Trump agenda. “Day one we’re moving the U.S. embassy to Jerusalem.
Netanyahu’s all in. Sheldon”—Sheldon Adelson, the casino billionaire, far-right Israel defender, and
Trump supporter—“is all in. We know where we’re heading on this.”
“Does Donald know?” asked a skeptical Ailes.
Bannon smiled—as though almost with a wink—and continued:
“Let Jordan take the West Bank, let Egypt take Gaza. Let them deal with it. Or sink trying. The
Saudis are on the brink, Egyptians are on the brink, all scared to death of Persia . . . Yemen, Sinai,
Libya . . . this thing is bad. . . . That’s why Russia is so key. . . . Is Russia that bad? They’re bad guys.
But the world is full of bad guys.”
Bannon offered all this with something like ebullience—a man remaking the world.
“But it’s good to know the bad guys are the bad guys,” said Ailes, pushing Bannon. “Donald may
not know.”
The real enemy, said an on-point Bannon, careful not to defend Trump too much or to dis him at
all, was China. China was the first front in a new cold war. And it had all been misunderstood in the
Obama years—what we thought we understood we didn’t understand at all. That was the failure of
American intelligence. “I think Comey is a third-rate guy. I think Brennan is a second-rate guy,”
Bannon said, dismissing the FBI director and the CIA director.
“The White House right now is like Johnson’s White House in 1968. Susan Rice”—Obama’s
National Security Advisor—“is running the campaign against ISIS as a National Security Advisor.
They’re picking the targets, she’s picking the drone strikes. I mean, they’re running the war with just
as much effectiveness as Johnson in sixty-eight. The Pentagon is totally disengaged from the whole
thing. Intel services are disengaged from the whole thing. The media has let Obama off the hook. Take
the ideology away from it, this is complete amateur hour. I don’t know what Obama does. Nobody on
Capitol Hill knows him, no business guys know him—what has he accomplished, what does he do?”
“Where’s Donald on this?” asked Ailes, now with the clear implication that Bannon was far out
ahead of his benefactor.
“He’s totally on board.”
“Focused?”
“He buys it.”
“I wouldn’t give Donald too much to think about,” said an amused Ailes.
Bannon snorted. “Too much, too little—doesn’t necessarily change things.”
* * *
“What has he gotten himself into with the Russians?” pressed Ailes.
“Mostly,” said Bannon, “he went to Russia and he thought he was going to meet Putin. But Putin
couldn’t give a shit about him. So he’s kept trying.”
“He’s Donald,” said Ailes.
“It’s a magnificent thing,” said Bannon, who had taken to regarding Trump as something like a
natural wonder, beyond explanation.
Again, as though setting the issue of Trump aside—merely a large and peculiar presence to both be
thankful for and to have to abide—Bannon, in the role he had conceived for himself, the auteur of the
Trump presidency, charged forward:
“China’s everything. Nothing else matters. We don’t get China right, we don’t get anything right.
This whole thing is very simple. China is where Nazi Germany was in 1929 to 1930. The Chinese,
like the Germans, are the most rational people in the world, until they’re not. And they’re gonna flip
like Germany in the thirties. You’re going to have a hypernationalist state, and once that happens you
can’t put the genie back in the bottle.”
“Donald might not be Nixon in China,” said Ailes, deadpan, suggesting that for Trump to seize the
mantle of global transformation might strain credulity.
Bannon smiled. “Bannon in China,” he said, with both remarkable grandiosity and wry selfdeprecation.
“How’s the kid?” asked Ailes, referring to Trump’s son-in-law and paramount political adviser,
thirty-six-year-old Jared Kushner.
“He’s my partner,” said Bannon, his tone suggesting that if he felt otherwise, he was nevertheless
determined to stay on message.
“Really?” said a dubious Ailes.
“He’s on the team.”
“He’s had lot of lunches with Rupert.”
“In fact,” said Bannon, “I could use your help here.” Bannon then spent several minutes trying to
recruit Ailes to help kneecap Murdoch. Ailes, since his ouster from Fox, had become only more bitter
towards Murdoch. Now Murdoch was frequently jawboning the president-elect and encouraging him
toward establishment moderation—all a strange inversion in the ever-stranger currents of American
conservatism. Bannon wanted Ailes to suggest to Trump, a man whose many neuroses included a
horror of forgetfulness or senility, that Murdoch might be losing it.
“I’ll call him,” said Ailes. “But Trump would jump through hoops for Rupert. Like for Putin.
Sucks up and shits down. I just worry about who’s jerking whose chain.”
The older right-wing media wizard and the younger (though not by all that much) continued on to
the other guests’ satisfaction until twelve-thirty, the older trying to see through to the new national
enigma that was Trump—although Ailes would say that in fact Trump’s behavior was ever
predictable—and the younger seemingly determined not to spoil his own moment of destiny.
“Donald Trump has got it. He’s Trump, but he’s got it. Trump is Trump,” affirmed Bannon.
“Yeah, he’s Trump,” said Ailes, with something like incredulity.
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